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 This brief analysis is based on the assumption that the formation of regionalism 
in Northeast Asia requires confidence building at multiple levels of relations in the 
region.  The central argument is that multilateral cooperation over non-traditional 
security issues will contribute to the building of mutual confidence in the region.  
“Northeast Asia” is geographically defined here to include China, Japan, North and 
South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia. 
 The paper first discusses the two key concepts underlying the analysis: 
“regionalism” and “non-traditional security.”  It then identifies the main factors thus 
far preventing the development of multilateral cooperation in security—including both 
traditional and non-traditional security—fields in Northeast Asia through a comparison 
with other regions of the world, where regionalism has moved further than in Northeast 
Asia, namely among the EU countries, in the NAFTA region, and among the ASEAN 
countries.  The discussion then moves to a brief look at the major non-traditional 
security issues in Northeast Asia, which call for multilateral cooperation.  The paper 
concludes with the central argument stated above. 
 
“Regionalism” Defined 
 According to Rozman,1 “regionalism” has five dimensions:  
1. an accelerated increase in economic relations supported by a common 
strategy for economic integration (i.e., economic integration); 
2. advancement of political relations through summitries and institutions 
designed to establish common action (i.e., institutional integration); 
3. social integration through labor migration and corporate networks or a 
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common agenda concerning various existing problems (i.e., social 
integration); 
4. shared recognition of a regional identity facilitated by a common culture 
amidst globalization (i.e., identity formation); and, 
5. an expanding security agenda for reducing tension and ensuring stability 
(i.e., security integration). 
 The process of integration through which regional agendas and identity are 
formed and sustained is called “regionalization” and the end result is called 
“regionalism”.  When regionalization proceeds successfully along all five dimensions 
and domestic processes and structures are intimately linked to region-level processes of 
integration, regionalism is said to be solid or deep.  Furthermore, for regionalization to 
continue on a sustained basis and produce peaceful consequences, transparent political 
processes, robust economic growth, and a fair distribution of the benefits of integration 
among the countries concerned are necessary.2 
Among all the various postwar regionalization schemes around the world, the 
European Union (EU) most closely meets the above conditions, followed by the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).  Within Asia-Pacific, region-wide integration 
lags far behind the European and the North American cases, but Southeast Asia is many 
years, perhaps decades, ahead of Northeast Asia in term of institutionalized regionalism.   
The NAFTA area is economically integrated, but its institutional and 
procedural structures are not nearly as complex as those of the EU.  Social integration 
is deep between the United States and Canada, whereas Mexico’s social integration with 
either the United States or Canada is less so.  NAFTA is not a security institution, but 
the United States and Canada share membership in the NATO and share a common 
security agenda, indicating deep political relationship between the two countries.  
Mexico has no such defense relations with either the United States or Canada, but there 
is no expectation or preparation for war between the NAFTA countries.  In this sense, 
the NAFTA region constitutes a quasi security community.3   
In contrast, the large number of countries and diversity of societies in Asia 
Pacific do not lend themselves easily to the formation of a common culture or shared 
historical experience within the region.  The countries of the region are also at various 
stages of economic development and their domestic political structures vary widely.  
Cultural diversity is also enormous.  The kind of hegemonic role the United States 
played in bringing about economic integration in North America is also absent in 
Asia-Pacific.  During the postwar decades, the hegemonic power of the United States 
functioned not as an integrative force but as a wedge between ideological-political rivals 
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in this region.  The end of the Cold War has made some degree of reconciliation 
possible between some of the adversaries in Asia-Pacific, but there are two states that 
remain divided, as well as a number of other countries that have only recently found a 
path toward historical reconciliation.  Consequently, a European-style regionalism is 
unlikely to develop in this region anytime soon. 
 
“Non-traditional Security” Defined 
 Let us turn to the concept of “non-traditional security.”  The concept has 
grown out of dissatisfaction with the traditional notions of “security” and “national 
security,” the research agenda based on these concepts, related theoretical arguments, 
and their influence on policy.  The critique of “traditional security” touches the five 
fundamental elements of “security.”  They are: (1) what values or whose values are to 
be protected? (2) what threatens those values? (3) what means are available to protect 
those values from the threats? (4) who is to provide those means, or instruments of 
security? And (5) who is to bear the cost of providing the security?   
 Here, the main criticisms of “traditional security” are briefly introduced. 
 First, the traditional concept of security has enjoyed a privileged position 
within the mainstream, realist paradigm of international politics.  The concept 
positions military threats and military responses at the center of national and 
international security policy and analysis.  Within this paradigm, environmental 
hazards, food shortage, resource depletion, and lack of or distortions in economic 
development are relegated to “low politics,” deemed to be of secondary importance to 
national and international security policy, hence deserving less attention from the 
research community.  However, deepening economic interdependence around the 
world and globalization trends have rendered non-military problems, including some 
domestic problems, increasingly important for their impact on the security of states and 
peoples around the globe.  The inadequacy of the traditional conception of security has 
been addressed by the development of such terms as “economic security,” “food 
security,” “energy and resource security,” and “environmental security.”  Some 
countries have officially adopted these concepts as part of their national security 
agenda.4 
 Secondly, the traditional concept of security has been criticized for its bias 
toward the protection of the interests of central governments and the privileged classes 
in society for which state institutions speak, to the neglect of the interests of ordinary 
citizens, particularly the underprivileged classes in society.  In other words, it is 
contended that “traditional security” has served as an ideology to serve the purpose of 
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state control and the maintenance of economic social structures favorable to the 
privileged classes.  As a result, the critique concludes, the political, social, and cultural 
institutions that are maintained in the name of “national security” view individual 
citizens’ freedom, health, and welfare as of secondary importance in terms of national 
security priorities.  Moreover, “traditional security” is criticized as an instrument of 
control of minorities and oppression of dissent in developing countries, where those out 
of power challenge the legitimacy of central authorities.  It is contended that such use 
or misuse of the agenda and instruments of national security can no longer be tolerated 
in a democratizing world.   
 Third, as already observed, “traditional security” more often than not neglects 
the security and safety of individuals.  However, security policy today and in the future 
must define as its ultimate goal the protection of human life and living and freedom 
from hunger, that is, human security.5  Security policy that is pursued at the expense of 
individual citizens’ life, health, and material welfare must be viewed as failing in its 
fundamental function.  However, it must also be stated that the absence of national 
security often implies the absence of human security.  That is, national and human 
security may not necessarily be mutually exclusive but rather complementary. 
 The exploration of alternative concepts of security, which encompasses 
non-military sources of insecurity and non-military means of security, is a welcome 
development.  However, “nontraditional security” also faces several challenges.  
Briefly, they are as follows: 
 First, there is as yet a consensus definition of “non-traditional security.”  
Economic development, social stability, provision of food, energy, and other resource, 
environmental protection, the protection of unique cultures, individuals’ freedom and 
freedom from hunger—these are all parts of non-traditional security.  It may be argued 
that for analytical purposes it is more useful to examine each of these types of security 
issues separately rather than subsuming them under the general concept of 
“non-traditional security.”  However, this fails to recognize the importance of the 
social and historical context in which “non-traditional security” has been proposed in 
opposition to or in contrast to “traditional security.”   
 Second, “non-traditional security” may be faulted for failing to recognize the 
different contents (referents) of security pertaining to the specific security needs and 
concerns of each country or area of the world.  That is, the use of “non-traditional 
security” as a catch-all reference for political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena 
suffers from the problem of equivalence.  What may be “non-traditional security” in 
one country may be quite traditional in another country.  For example, “economic 
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security,” “food security,” and “energy security” were accepted as important national 
security issues in the 1970s and today are considered part of “traditional” security issues 
in Japan.  “Human security” has also been adopted as part of official Japanese 
diplomacy and the Japanese government has been a strong supporter of the UN 
Commission on Human Security and the Fund for Human Security.6  China has issued 
a position paper on international cooperation in non-traditional security fields, which 
includes terrorism, drugs, HIV/AIDS, piracy, illegal migration, environmental security, 
economic security, and information security.7  However, the Chinese government 
avoids the use of the term “human security” in its official pronouncements.8  In the 
United States, “economic security” became an important policy issue under the Clinton 
Administration, but has not become a part of the mainstream national security debate.  
Neither is “food security” a part of the mainstream security discussion in the United 
States.  Indeed there are these and other important differences in the mainstream 
understandings of national and international security in different countries.  However, 
to what degree and under what circumstances these various “non-traditional security” 
issues have become part of the security debate in the establishment of each country can 
be an interesting focus of comparative analysis.  That is, the readiness of a society to 
accept “non-traditional security” as deserving of national attention equal in importance 
to traditional security can be defined as a dependent variable along which societies can 
be compared.  This approach may reveal important differences in the relationship 
between state and society and between the military and the civilian sector, as well as 
historical, cultural, and geographical differences between the societies we study.9 
 Third, with respect to the question of who “securitizes” issues, interest in 
“non-traditional security” may be criticized for overlooking the fact that in the end it is 
the state apparatus that determines which issues are of importance to national security 
and therefore the introduction of “non-traditional security” cannot overcome the 
state-centric security paradigm.  However, the criticism ignores the importance of the 
very process through which public policy issues become securitized.  If pressure from 
nongovernmental concerns leads to the inclusion of non-traditional security issues in 
national security debate, it is of historical importance in Northeast Asia where central 
authorities have historically monopolized on the national security agenda.   The 
process of securitization that includes the participation of non-state agents clearly 
deserves our attention.  A more inclusive process of security agenda setting may very 
well be a consequence and evidence of the democratization of society.  The 
democratization of national security debate should reveal the fact that ultimately 
sovereign citizens are responsible for their own security and if state authorities’ 
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monopoly of national security discussion is inadequate in addressing the citizens’ 
security needs, they should press their issues forward.  Indeed, many non-traditional 
security issues, e.g., energy security and environmental security, cannot be left to the 
public sector alone.  Democratization of society requires transparency and 
accountability on the part of those who formulate national response to the society’s 
security concerns.  This in turn requires that the citizenry be well educated and well 
informed about national security issues, both traditional and non-traditional. 
 What is important to the academic community is how a given concept is useful 
in analyzing and understanding the phenomenon with which the community is 
concerned.  Let us see how the concept of “non-traditional security” aids our 
understanding of the security challenges facing Northeast Asian countries in the 
contemporary period.  Before we do so, however, we need to identify the reasons why 
regionalism has been slow in developing in this part of the world by comparing it with 
regionalization in other parts of the world.   
 
Regionalisms Compared   
 Several factors account for the successful regional integration in Europe.  
First, through their long history of war and peace, European countries developed a 
common culture in their state-to-state relations.  State diplomacy and international law 
became shared arenas of interaction between the European sovereigns.  The 
Westphalian notions of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political 
independence became fundamental elements of state-to-state diplomacy and were 
legitimized as international legal principles.  Through the expansion of 
Europe-centered international diplomacy and commerce, the concepts also became 
legitimized in other parts of the world, including Northeast Asia.  Normative in their 
origin, these concepts were accepted as descriptive (real) terms as well, rendering 
analyses based on them legitimate.  Realism was born of this tradition.  Second, the 
realist notions of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence 
were used to manage cross-border exchanges in commerce, culture, and human 
migration, providing grounds for restricting cross-national and trans-national identities.  
At the end of the Second World War, European leaders shared the consensus that 
postwar peace and stability in the region required economic integration, particularly 
integration of German and French economies.  The leaders were able to translate this 
common understanding into institutional realities thanks to their common civilization 
and cultural backgrounds.  Moreover, the United States--the emerging world 
power--viewed regional integration in Europe as conducive to its own national interests.  
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The identification of U.S. interests and European integration was aided by Washington’s 
historical preference to avoid entanglement in European power politics and the 
emergence of Cold War animosities between the East and the West.  Consequently, 
Washington provided generous support for economic development and integration and 
defense alliance in Europe.  
 In North America, the essential factor contributing to the formation of the free 
trade agreement (NAFTA) was the United States’ hegemonic power of production and 
consumption and its need of expanded markets to sustain its capitalist growth.  
Secondly, unable either to challenge the U.S. economic power in global competition or 
to sustain growth on their own, both Canada and Mexico needed the superfluous 
production and consumption power of the United States.  The existing quasi-security 
community was the third contributory factor for the development of NAFTA as it 
rendered unnecessary any concern about the security implications of regional economic 
integration.  In short, U.S. hegemony made regional integration in North America 
possible and aided integration in Western Europe.  The U.S.-led globalization is further 
accelerating integration in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe, where, thanks to 
civilizational and cultural commonalities, fewer signs of resistance to globalization are 
seen than in Asia.   
 The formation of regionalism in Asia-Pacific is lagging far behind that in 
Europe and North America.  The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process 
is not an institution for political integration or security consultation.  APEC is a 
reactive response by policymakers in the region to the deepening interdependence 
among their economies and its consequences for domestic economic management.  It 
is led not by hegemonic leadership or a common civilizational background or cultural 
identity but by pragmatic considerations to manage international frictions and domestic 
problems resulting from growing economic interdependence.  APEC is essentially a 
forum for dialogue, not a mechanism for joint action.  Although some 
institutionalization is seen, including the secretariat and the regular meetings of heads of 
state and cabinet ministers, they are designed to facilitate dialogue. 
 Within Asia-Pacific, institutional efforts toward economic integration are far 
more advanced in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia.  In the former region, 
however, centripetal forces have long worked against integration among the developing 
economies.  Strong ethnic loyalties and multiple cultures in each country have delayed 
the development of democracy and liberal market forces and prevented the emergence 
of a strong leadership for regional integration.  Moreover, the region’s economies have 
developed dependence ties with extra-regional economies, i.e., the U.S., Japanese, 
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Chinese, and European economies.  It is only in the last decade that the ASEAN 
leaders have decided to strengthen regional solidarity against the dominance of external 
economic powers through the development of a free trade area in Southeast Asia by 
2015.  On the political-security front, the Southeast Asian nations failed to find a 
common adversary during the Cold War.  Political rivalries within the region also 
hampered the development of a common approach to many of the security issues in the 
region.  The leaders of the region established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with 
encouragement from Japan, but it is a forum for dialogue rather than a mechanism for 
common defense.  Its main purpose is to facilitate confidence-building measures.  It 
is true, however, that Southeast Asia, through the ASEAN process, has developed a 
regional identity of sorts.   
 In comparison, Northeast Asia is not an economic unit, nor a political or a 
security community, but largely a geographic referent.10   There are several reasons for 
this.11 
 First, post-war Northeast Asia was riddled with conflicts and tensions due to 
legacies of history.  The countries of the region were unable to reach reconciliation 
over the prewar and wartime history of militarism and imperialism.  The birth of 
socialist states in the region and the permeation of the area by the East-West divide 
during the Cold War prevented the settlement of prewar and wartime atrocities.   
Secondly, the state-centric international relations of the region severely restricted 
cross-national market forces and also stifled the growth of civil society in most of the 
countries of the region.  As a result, economic and social exchanges transcending 
national borders could not gain momentum.  Nationalism remained strong and 
internationalism weak.  Authoritarian leadership generally prevailed over nascent 
democratic forces and established highly centralized political structures and mobilized 
national resources for the purpose of nation building.  Consequently, the international 
relations of the region nurtured competitive and even confrontational approaches rather 
than cooperation.  Moreover, the interests of the great powers--the United States, the 
Soviet Union, China, and Japan--intersected in this region, preventing the development 
of region-wide relationships of equality or dominance-subordination.  Unlike in North 
America, the hegemonic power of the United States worked not to integrate but divide 
most of the regional powers.  Nor did the countries of the region share a common 
civilizational space or cultural affinity.  Furthermore, under these circumstances, 
bilateralism prevailed over multilateralism.  Only in the 1990s did the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea forge multilateral coordination with respect to their approaches 
to North Korea, but the trilateral consultations were not designed to facilitate broad 
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multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia but predicated on the division of the Korean 
peninsula.  The six-party talks that emerged in 2003 in response to the North Korean 
nuclear crisis has the potential of developing into a lasting multilateral framework for 
regional security cooperation, but this is far from certain.  Finally, the presence of 
capitalist and socialist economic systems, highly developed and underdeveloped 
economies, and resource-rich and capital-rich countries rendered region-wide 
integration impossible.  Asymmetric economic needs and capabilities prevented the 
emergence of balanced exchanges of economic benefits through interdependence.  In 
the absence of mutual trust at the state level and economic-social interaction in the 
private sector, free trade and other integrative schemes remained a distant goal in this 
region, although more recently interest in bilateral and trilateral free trade arrangements 
has grown. 
 For the above reasons until recently the past defined the present, politics 
reigned over economics, the state controlled civil society, and nationalism prevailed 
over internationalism in Northeast Asia.  Naturally, therefore, traditional national 
security interests dominated non-traditional security concerns.   
 In the last decade, however, the cloud of history has begun to lift from the 
political landscape of the region.  The future-directed reorientation of Japanese-South 
Korean relations since the late 1990s is an important evidence of this, as is the 
improvement of overall Russo-Japanese relations in recent years, notwithstanding the 
territorial disputes that still exist in these bilateral relations.  As well, economic ties 
among most Northeast Asian countries have grown substantially during this period.  
As much as 30-60 percent of each Northeast Asian country’s trade is now conducted 
within the region.  Even Japan and China, the two big powers that are still haunted by 
the issues of history, have found their growing economic relations mutually beneficial.  
Moreover, civil society is also developing in all Northeast Asian countries except North 
Korea, contributing to the growth of trans-national ties between nongovernmental 
groups and local organizations, some of them with enough political clout to affect 
national policies.12 
 If the post-1990s trends continue, they cannot but have an important impact on 
the security environment of Northeast Asia.  We already witness the emergence of 
non-traditional security issues in the domestic and international discussion in the region.  
Let us now turn to those issues. 
 
Nontraditional Security Issues in Northeast Asia 
 There are seven sets of issues facing Northeast Asian countries that can be 
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defined as “non-traditional security” issues.13  Let us briefly look at each.   
 Environmental problems are clearly transnational problems that require 
international cooperation.14  Acid rain and nuclear waste disposal at sea are examples 
of trans-border problems that cannot be solved through unilateral measures.  Global 
warming is another problem area in which multilateral cooperation is clearly in order, 
particularly between Japan, South Korea, and China, the three biggest sources of CO2 
emissions in this region.  Successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol requires 
Russia’s ratification of this global legal instrument, but it appears Moscow is not eager 
to submit to the new regime.  Most environmental problems in Northeast Asia are 
being addressed through unilateral measures.  There are multiple conferences and 
forums for discussion, as well as some technical cooperation and information exchange 
on a bilateral or a multilateral basis, but there are no regional frameworks with legally 
binding force. 
 Resource scarcity and depletion and water resource problems also exist in 
Northeast Asia and their solutions require international cooperation.  For example, 
many fishery resources and forestry resources are being exploited beyond nature’s 
ability to renew them.  The development and use of coal and oil to fuel the fast 
growing economies of the region add to the environmental strain.  Natural gas is touted 
as an “environmentally friendly” source of energy and the APEC has called for regional 
cooperation to accelerate the development of reserves in east Siberia and the Russian 
Far East.  The energy needs of Japan and China are expected to continue to grow and 
there are already indications of competition between these giant economies for Russia’s 
natural gas supply.  Desertification of agricultural land and shortage of water in China 
and Mongolia are also serious problems that require international cooperation.  
 Migration and other human flows across national borders pose human security 
threats in the region.15  International migration that has long been a global 
phenomenon is now an important regional trend in Northeast Asia.  The growing 
cross-border human flows in Northeast Asia take various forms, including legal and 
illegal labor migration, refugees, defectors, and human trafficking.  Together with 
international tourists and short-term visitors, these flows are having visible impacts on 
host communities.  Racial discrimination, illegal employment, and prostitution that are 
often associated with cross-border human flows have serious human security 
implications, for both foreign nationals and local citizens.  Some human flows raise 
real or potential diplomatic problems: Chinese migration to the Russian Far East, North 
Koreans defecting to China and other countries, Chinese workers and students illegally 
working in Japan and South Korea, Russian and other women who enter Japan, South 
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Korea, and China on tourist visas but are forced or enticed into prostitution and other 
illegal forms of employment, often with the involvement of organized crime in the 
sending and receiving countries.  These problems arise from the existence of marked 
gaps in economic opportunities and disparate demographic and population patterns in 
the countries of Northeast Asia.  Therefore, solutions require a regional approach that 
addresses both “push” and “pull” factors systematically and comprehensively, 
encompassing economic development, population, immigration, and nationality and 
citizenship policies.   Such cooperation is absent today. 
 Drug and arms smuggling is yet another non-traditional security problem that 
requires international cooperation.  Narcotics produced in Central and Southeast Asia 
find their way to markets in Japan, South Korea, and Russia, often through China.  The 
rise in illegal arms trade in Northeast Asia is largely a result of the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the ineffectiveness of post-Soviet arms control structures.  North Korea is 
also a major source of illegal arms traded in and beyond this region.  Organized crime 
is also involved in illegal arms transfer to markets in Japan and South Korea.  
Response to these problems has been largely unilateral and bilateral, with very limited 
multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.   
 HIV/AIDS and SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) are major threats to 
individual and public health.  The SARS epidemic in 2002-03 exposed the lack of 
transparency and ineffectiveness of public health policy in China and affected not only 
Chinese citizens but also those of many other countries.  Concealment and 
under-reporting of infection cases by medical personnel and public officials seriously 
affected public trust inside China and outside, resulting in the firing of the mayor of 
Beijing and the health minister of China.  International cooperation, partly coordinated 
by the World Health Organization, eventually put a stop to what could have become a 
devastating global crisis, but not until the world had witnessed numerous preventable 
deaths.  The health ministers of the ASEAN + 3 countries agreed on the importance of 
transparency in public health policy, improving the living conditions, and accelerating 
economic development, particularly in the poor sections of the member countries.  The 
SARS crisis demonstrated that governments that are unable to protect their citizens’ 
lives and health cannot protect human security.   
 The 1997-98 “Asian crisis” demonstrated how devastating the effects of 
globalization could be for countries that are ill prepared to deal with the fast-paced 
inflow and outflow of international capital.  Some analysts blamed the crisis on the 
mismanagement of corporate finance and lack of policy transparency and urged the 
affected countries to accelerate financial market liberalization, while others attributed 
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the crisis to the lack of government control over international capital, with Malaysia 
closing its financial market to foreign speculators in response to the crisis.16  In 
Northeast Asia, South Korea and Russia were the most severely affected by the 
financial-currency crisis of 1997-98, with their currencies suffering devastating 
depreciation.  In some Southeast Asian countries, the crisis triggered social unrest, the 
worse case being Indonesia, where anti-Chinese sentiments fueled ethnic violence and 
public unrest resulted in the fall of government.  Economic crisis directly threatened 
human security.  In the aftermath of the crisis, a major international disagreement was 
seen, particularly between Japan and the United States, over how to prevent the 
recurrence of a similar crisis.  U.S. objection to the “Miyazawa Plan” killed the 
Japanese finance minister’s proposal to institute a special fund to assist governments 
whose currencies are targeted for attack by international speculators.  However, the 
ASEAN + 3 countries have begun to establish a pool of currency reserves for member 
governments threatened by impending currency attack to draw on.  However, the 
necessary structural reforms require sustained, long-term efforts, particularly in 
reducing rich-poor gap in the region’s developing economies.   
 Terrorism has both “traditional” and “non-traditional” security aspects.  The 
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 are said to have changed the 
world. 17   Whether one accepts this assessment or not, one cannot deny that 
international terrorism requires the cooperation of the entire international community.   
However, post-9/11 developments have proven the difficulty of building a unified 
international position on how best to counter international terrorism.  The U.S. “war 
against terrorism” has divided the international community.  The United States and 
Great Britain justified their military attack on Iraq on the unproved claims that the 
Saddam Hussein regime was linked to the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaida and that Iraq was 
hiding weapons of mass destruction.  France, Germany, Russia, and China insisted that 
the attack on Iraq was premature at best and unjustified at worst inasmuch as the United 
Nations had not been given sufficient time to substantiate the U.S. and British charges 
against Iraq.  Japan, while calling for international cooperation through the United 
Nations, decided in December 2003 to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to 
U.S.-occupied Iraq and participate in what Tokyo called post-conflict reconstruction 
assistance.  In the United States and elsewhere around the world, civil liberties have 
been curtailed by security measures designed to prevent terrorist attacks.  Moreover, 
there have been numerous charges in the United States that persons of certain ethnic 
(e.g., Arab) background have been subjected to unfair and unjust security measures.   
 Whether international terrorism should be seen in the light of  “non-traditional 
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security” is subject to debate.  On the one hand, international terrorism is “traditional” 
if it is seen as an armed attack against sates and their interests and if the response 
involves the military and other action of the targeted or affected states.  Moreover, 
terrorist organizations often claim that the political, economic, and social environment 
surrounding them justify their action to challenge the legitimacy and expose the 
incompetence of their own and other states.  Such justifications have much in common 
with the claims of more traditional armed insurgencies against states or regimes.  On 
the other hand, much of the internationalization of terrorist organizations’ recruitment of 
members, acquisition of arms, intelligence gathering, and financial mobilization is a 
part of the globalization phenomenon sweeping the world.  Seen in this light, 
international terrorism has much in common with the trafficking in arms, drugs, and 
humans by private organizations, which, as seen above, is very much a part of the 
“non-traditional security” problem.  Furthermore, terrorist organizations are 
non-governmental organizations and more often than not select private citizens and 
groups as their immediate target even when their goal is to weaken the states against 
which they have political gripes.  Clearly, then, the state-centric definition of security 
is inadequate to deal with international terrorism. 
 Terrorism in Northeast Asia has been a mixed phenomenon in terms of 
traditional and non-traditional elements of security.  We saw state terrorism by North 
Korea in the 1970s.  Its proximate and ultimate targets were the South Korean 
government and its representatives.  We also witnessed Japanese terrorist groups 
challenging the legitimacy of their state in the 1960s and 70s, as well as a religiously 
motivated group terrorizing private citizens in the country in the 1980s.  More recently 
we have seen terrorist attacks by independence-seeking groups in China and Russia 
against their states.  With the exception of the North Korean case, all groups conducted 
their acts of terrorism within the territorial boundaries of their own states.  The 
response to most of these acts has been largely through internal measures on the basis of 
domestic law rather than through multilateral mechanisms.   
 
Conclusions 
 In view of the historical and structural characteristics of Northeast Asia, we 
will be hard pressed to build in the near future a multilateral framework to solve 
security problems that have their causes in territorial, sovereignty, and other political 
conflicts between states in the region.  Fundamentally, the establishment of such a 
framework would require the level of trust that simply does not exist today between the 
region’s governments and peoples of the countries.  We may be better positioned to 
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explore international cooperation over non-traditional security issues as a means of 
building confidence and forming a habit of cooperation.  In fact, the non-traditional 
security issues discussed in this paper present an opportunity to seek such cooperation 
because bilateral and multilateral efforts in these areas is not likely to threaten the 
regional powers’ pursuit of traditional security goals, namely the protection of national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.   
 In Northeast Asia, the expansion of transnational market linkages is deepening 
the interdependence of regional economies.  If market development in China, the 
Russian Far East, and Mongolia proceeds, economic complementarities between these 
economies and the more advanced market economies of Japan and South Korea are 
bound to translate the existing potentials into visible benefits for the producers and 
consumers in the regional markets.  Social integration proceeds through the network of 
corporate and human linkages.  On the corporate side, industrial and commercial 
enterprises in East Asia have made substantial progress through horizontal and vertical 
integration over the last several decades, with Japanese corporations in Southeast Asia 
and China taking the lead.  The formation of transnational corporate linkages in 
Northeast Asian countries is a more recent phenomenon.  It has been driven by 
businesses in Japan and, more recently, in South Korea, contributing to the growth of 
Japanese-South Korean-Chinese corporate networks.  Human networks in Northeast 
Asia are slowly emerging through growing numbers of border-crossing migrants, 
professionals, and laborers.  Multilateral linkages in the traditional security field are of 
an ad hoc nature and limited to the six-party talks concerning the North Korean nuclear 
issue and bilateral and trilateral consultations associated with them.   
There are ample opportunities--as well as needs--for multilateral cooperation in 
the non-traditional security field, encompassing environmental, resource, migration, 
arms and drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS, SARS, economic globalization, and terrorism 
issues.  Problems in this area directly affect people’s lives and livelihoods, and 
successful cooperation, through governmental channels or at the non-governmental 
level, is bound to produce visible benefits to the citizenry.  Moreover, solution to many 
of the non-traditional security problems requires the direct involvement of ordinary 
citizens.  Successful efforts in this area, therefore, will be conducive to the formation 
of social networks around the issues involved and to the development of cooperative 
efforts in other areas.   
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